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There is an ongoing debate about the need for standards for improvised explosive device (IED) activities. The emer-gence of civilian IED response follows the development 
of humanitarian mine action (HMA) in many ways. In particular, 
the problems of defining contractual targets and norms were prob-
lematic in the early days of HMA, when, as for the IED response 
today, money has started to change hands for services rendered. 
It is the premise of this editorial that the need for humanitarian 
IED (HIED) response standards derives from the contractual na-
ture of the relationship between the client and the service provider. 
Therefore, if they are to be of use, any new IED response standards 
for use in the humanitarian sector must not simply rehash existing 
technical military-oriented counter-IED (C-IED) procedures but 
must address the problems caused by the introduction of a civilian 
business model, and also take account of their relationship with 
the humanitarian sphere.
Such tasks, when conducted by security forces, are managed 
using what amounts to an honor system. Teams carry out work 
to the best of their ability, with supervision and quality manage-
ment provided through the chain of command. There are no re-
quirements for extra, contractual stipulations as work processes 
are defined by internal norms such as organizational standard 
operating procedures (SOP). 
However, when financial pressures are applied to services pro-
vided under contract, standard economic theory suggests that there 
is an added, economic incentive to increase output at the expense 
of quality. This was widely observed in the early days of HMA and 
a series of process controls evolved to address this issue. Thus, the 
question remains: what problems are likely to be faced in the qual-
ity management of civilian IED response, and what processes can 
be used to address these problems?
Definitions and Assumptions 
Firstly, it is important to take a view on the debate regarding 
the definition of IED and its relationship to other terms, namely 
(improvised) landmine and booby trap. For the purposes of this 
editorial, it is held that these terms overlap and describe different 
attributes of any particular device. The term IED refers solely to the 
way an explosive device is made, and a mine is a weapon activated 
by the victim. Thus, a device that is manufactured in an improvised 
manner and set up to be activated by the victim is both an IED and 
a mine. Similarly, given that a booby trap functions when the victim 
carries out an apparently harmless act, there is considerable room 
for overlap between the three terms. 
Secondly, there is increasing recognition in the HMA sector that 
the status of an IED is particularly relevant in determining the 
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active and legacy to describe whether or not an IED is in play or is, 
in effect, an explosive remnant of war (ERW). This article uses the 
following definitions:
Active device. The term active device is used to describe any IED 
that is still under the effective control of the individual or group 
that deployed them, or where the local populations and relevant 
authorities in those locations do not wish to see them removed.
Legacy device. The term legacy device is used to describe any 
IED that is no longer under the effective control of the individual or 
group that deployed them, and where the local populations and rel-
evant authorities in those locations wish to see them removed. Any 
device that does not meet the definitions of a legacy device should 
be considered an active device. 
Thirdly, there needs to be a common understanding of what IED 
response means. C-IED is commonly held to be an overarching 
range of activities, including actions to:
• Attack the network (of insurgents using IEDs).
• Reduce casualties.
• Defeat the device.
• Train the capacity.
It is the assumption of this editorial that HIED response will not 
attack the network but can be involved in any (or all) of the other 
elements of C-IED. 
Fourthly, it is also the assumption of this editorial that HIED is 
as much a subset of the HMA sector as it is a subset of C-IED. Thus, 
this can be visualized as a Venn diagram (see Figure 1).
Finally, these notes are written to help understand how civilian 
organizations (both commercial and NGO) can contribute to HIED 
activities. One issue that has become increasingly clear in recent 
months is the difference between working in a humanitarian or a se-
curity environment (as illustrated in Figure 1). This is often linked in 
discussions about whether or not the IED is an active or legacy de-
vice (as described previously). While there is a link between these 
questions, the terms should not be used interchangeably. Rather it is 
suggested that the following distinctions should be drawn:
Legacy IED. Only humanitarian considerations are relevant.
Active IED. Both HIED and C-IED approaches are relevant, de-
pending on the requirement.
These notes are primarily intended to consider HIED under condi-
tions where the IED is no longer considered active or in play. There is a 
brief discussion at the end of this editorial about what difference an ac-
tive scenario might make to contractual standards for HIED activities.
Challenges: How Much Search is Enough?
All HIED activities—and particularly search activities—
represent a need to strike a reasonable balance between 
effectiveness and efficiency. One of the main differences between 
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IEDs and other explosive weapons is that IEDs are (almost) always 
disguised. As a result, significant effort must be spent to locate the 
device before disposal action can be taken. Given the range of com-
plexity (particularly in terms of disguise) of many modern IEDs, to 
always be fully effective one might have to dismantle all buildings 
brick by brick to be 100 percent certain that the building does not 
contain IEDs. This is akin to destroying the village in order to save 
it and is, in effect, doing the enemy’s job for them. Such a compre-
hensive approach to search is also very inefficient as dismantling of 
a building will take a search team a very long time.
On the other hand, there is potentially a perverse incentive 
for civilian HIED operators to maximize efficiency (particularly 
if they are paid by the number of tasks completed or the square 
meterage covered) by minimizing the effort (or effectiveness) of 
search activities. Without clear, contractual requirements and 
norms in place, there is a risk of ‘rush to the bottom’ quality in 
civilian HIED work. A similar problem was resolved in the early 
days of HMA through the development of clearance norms, re-
sulting in, for example, the need to search 100 percent of a desig-
nated area to a specific depth in area clearance, i.e., either mine 
clearance or battle area clearance (BAC). Quality assurance (QA) 
and quality control (QC) procedures were developed to help en-
sure and check that clearance was carried out to the required ex-
tent. Similar requirements can be applied to area clearance of 
victim activated IEDs (VOIED) where these have been employed 
as improvised mines. However, as described previously, this is 
problematic in terms of other search tasks, particularly building 
tasks. It begs the question: how much search is enough? 
Is it a new device, or one that was missed? Another problem en-
countered in the early days of HMA was when a mine was subse-
quently found in an area declared as clear. This often resulted in 
claims of re-mining even when there was no ongoing conflict. This 
is likely to be a more significant problem in civilian HIED activities 
given the very real risk of continued IED use by stay-behind person-
nel or renewed activity by insurgents. However, as in HMA, claims 
of re-mining may also be a convenient excuse for poor HIED activi-
ties. The use of formal handover processes and the retention of li-
ability for a task site helped reduce claims of re-mining in HMA. 
Identifying the difference between active and legacy tasks in what 
is emerging as the humanitarian IED sector has been an early step 
to help ameliorate this problem, but there is still a need to consider 
how to address any stay-behind IED activities in this regard.
What should be expected of HIED? A third problem addressed 
in the development of the HMA sector was the need to clarify the 
outputs (and hence outcomes) of various HMA activities. The de-
velopment of the five HMA pillars (see Figure 2) was an early but 
perhaps flawed attempt to do this.1 It was useful because it helped 
explain that mine action was greater than mine clearance. It was 
flawed because it mixed field operations with the advocacy ele-
ments of mine action, and specifically because it did not recognize 
the key role played by mobile explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
teams in dealing with spot tasks involving unexploded ordnance 
(UXO). 
Subsequent work identified the three main field products of 
the HMA sector as area clearance (minefield or BAC), mobile 
EOD spot tasks, and mine risk education (MRE).2 This clarifica-
tion in turn helps identify the incommensurate values of these 
actions: area clearance is something that produces cleared land 
and does not necessarily reduce casualties, and EOD spot tasks 
and MRE, which act to reduce casualties (either by removing haz-
ards or modifying behavior) but do not act to clear areas of land. 
These clarifications assist in the establishment of a Theory of 
Change (ToC) for HMA by setting out the different outputs and 
outcomes for the main HMA products.
Scoping HIED tasks
Defining core HIED response pillars. The core humanitarian 
HIED pillars can be defined as follows:
1. Search involves all actions to locate, access, and confirm sus-
pect IED, or to establish the absence of such devices.3
2. IED Disposal (IEDD) includes all actions required to make 
an IED permanently ineffective.4
3. IED risk education (IED RE) is an educational process in-
tended to reduce casualties from IEDs through the modifica-
tion of behavior.5
A Theory of Change for HIED
A similar treatment needs to be done to establish the metrics of 
HIED activities. Indeed, this can be considered the prime require-
ment to establish a quality management regime for HIED. A ToC for 
typical HIED activities can be summarized as in Figure 3. Danish 
Demining Group (DDG) is currently doing more work on the ToC 










Mitigate human impact Attack the network
Key: Typical examples of 
activities within HMA and C-IED
1.    Mine/area clearance
2.    Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
3.    Mine Risk Education (MRE)
4.    Search
5.    IED Disposal (IEDD)
6.    IED Risk Education (IED RE)
7.    Force protection
8.    Forensics
9.    Intelligence gathering
Figure 1. Interrelationship between HMA and C-IED. The rugby-ball-shaped area in the center represents the HIED response subsector. Note that 
humanitarian responses tend to focus on mitigating impact, whereas C-IED activities tend to focus on attacking the network. A list of examples of 
typical activities in both sectors, including in the HIED subsector, are shown in the key. These activities are discussed in more detail in the text.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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Figure 2. The HMA Pillars.1
• CLEARANCE. Removing and destroying landmines and explosive remnants of war, and marking or fencing off areas contami-
nated with them
• EDUCATION. Risk education helps people understand the risks they face, identify mines and explosive remnants of war, and 
learn how to stay out of harm’s way
• VICTIM ASSISTANCE. Medical assistance and rehabilitation services to victims, including job-skills training and employment 
opportunities
• ADVOCACY. Advocating for a world free from the threat of landmines and encouraging countries to participate in interna-
tional treaties and conventions
• STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. Helping countries destroy their stockpiles of mines as required by international agreements
Goals (SDG), and it is hoped that this more detailed work can be 
shared soon.
Note again the incommensurate values in these different tasks. 
Search tasks, like mine clearance or BAC, do not necessarily find 
IEDs, thus they cannot be considered as primarily resulting in a re-
duction of casualties. They do however result in the release of safe 
land. Similarly, IEDD and IED RE do not result in cleared land but 
can be expected to reduce casualties either by the removal of haz-
ards or by the modification of behavior (again, this is akin to con-
ventional EOD spot tasks and MRE in the HMA sphere).
Also note that Figure 3 does not consider area clearance of 
VOIED fields. As has been made clear elsewhere, VOIED employed 
as improvised mines are covered adequately by existing HMA defi-
nitions and approaches, providing the appropriate equipment and 
detailed, render-safe procedures are in place. 
Possible Contracting Modalities and Deliverables for 
HIED Activities
There are two contracting models available to address the 
problems discussed in this editorial. Firstly, there is the output-
based model, as commonly used in commercial mine clearance. 
This model normally uses a firm, fixed-price bidding process to 
maximize efficiency. In an output-based model, service provid-
ers would be paid for the area of land cleared, normally through a 
pre-defined scope of works (including specifications of the prod-
uct quality) as included in the contract. This model is attractive 
for clients requiring a specific area cleared to a defined depth, but 
it lacks f lexibility in case of any new requirements identified dur-
ing the course of the project. It is also unsuitable for spot tasks. 
Output-based models are also particularly suitable for training 
or RE projects where the key deliverable is the number of train-
ing recipients. The main risk with output-based contracting for 
area clearance is ensuring effectiveness, i.e., that the quality of 
the output meets the desired specification, but this can be ad-
dressed with appropriate quality management processes.
The second potential contracting model for HIED activities is 
the service-contract model. In a service contract, the suppliers 
would be contracted to provide a capacity capable of carrying out 
pre-defined types of tasks for a specified period of time. Acceptable 
response times can be included in the specification. Service con-
tracts are suited to tasks that are not easily measurable in terms 
of units of output, and therefore lend themselves to more complex 
spot tasks such as a building search (or IEDD). Service contracts 
are flexible as it allows the client to deploy the teams when and 
where desired. Such contracts thus lend themselves to maximizing 
effectiveness, but there is a risk of poor efficiency if the client does 
not contract for the appropriate number of teams or if the teams are 
slow at responding. This can be managed through use of response 
time analysis and a contracting model that allows for penalizing of 
poor service provision.6 The application of these two contracting 
models in HIED is summarized in Figure 4.
It should be noted that it is possible to use service contracts for 
area work such as area or route searches, and this may be appro-
priate where a number of small or otherwise unpredictable search 
tasks are expected. However, there is an increased risk in lower con-
tractual efficiency as a result. It may even be appropriate to use both 
models, where large output-based search contracts allow for econo-
mies of scale, and service-contract models are used to allow for un-
planned or otherwise complex tasks. 
As has been discussed previously, one of the key issues in HIED 
search is that, unlike for mine clearance or BAC, it is not possible 
to define the scope of a building-search task in terms of 100 per-
cent search to a defined depth. A reputable search team command-
er will investigate any ground sign until they are sure that there 
Figure 3. Summary Theory of Change of HIED activities, key outputs, and outcomes.
Ser HIED activity Area or 
spot
Output Outcome Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 Area (rummage) 
search for cache/
hides
Area M2 searched 
Cache found
Increased productive use of 
safe land
Note: clearance of VOIED fields as for 
HMA minefields
2 Route search Area Linear m/km 
searched
Increased productive use of 
safe route
3 Building search Spot Building 
searched
Safe access to building
4 IED  
disposal (IEDD)
Spot IED destroyed • Removal of hazard
• Reduction of casualties
Includes vehicle search
5 IED risk education 
(IED RE)
n/a RE given • Modification of behavior
• Reduction of casualties
As for MRE but taking account of  ‘do no 
harm’ and improvised nature of devices
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are no IEDs present, but the risk in a civilian scenario is where an 
amoral service provider decides to maximize profit through either 
expediting search quickly or by skimping on the training or other 
costs of the teams. Thus, in any circumstance where the only con-
tracting proviso is unit cost, reputable search teams will tend to 
lose out to providers willing to provide a cheaper but potentially 
ineffective service. 
Quality Management Techniques Available for HIED
The establishment of a quality management (QM) framework for 
HIED activities becomes easier now that the definitions of the ac-
tivities are established, their inter-relationships are clear, and a ToC 
for each activity is in place. Many of the QM techniques as set out 
in Figure 5 may be familiar from HMA. Others may be additionally 
appropriate for HIED actions, particularly for search. Figure 5 rep-
resents a summary of the various QM techniques. More work needs 
to be done to adapt them to HIED in detail.
Quality in HIED Contract Design
As set out previously, the handover process developed in HMA 
for area clearance is applicable to HIED area and route search. 
However, contracts for building search may need to account for 
finds after handover. This could involve the use of follow-up stud-
ies in the event of missed items to identify whether the search team 
could have been expected to find the item if conducting drills prop-
erly. The assumption of legacy items will be key in this regard. It 
may also be useful for such contracts to be able to cancel funding in 
cases of poor technical performance. The details of contract design 
will vary greatly with each funder, but it may make sense to include 
a periodic progress and quality review for the purposes of continu-
ing or cancelling contracts. One other point: it is clear that simply 
going for the lowest price in the absence of contractual benchmarks 
will not result in a HIED service that is fit for purpose.
Bonds, Indemnities, and Compensation
To indemnify is to compensate for loss or damage; to provide 
security for financial reimbursement to an individual in case of a 
specified loss incurred by the person.7
Given that a specific problem is how to ensure that HIED service 
providers guarantee that enough effort is spent on a search, then it 
might be appropriate to require some form of indemnity as com-
pensation in the event that an item is missed and then either subse-
quently found or inadvertently detonated. This could be in the form 
of a bid bond or through retaining part of the payments until after 
the contract is completed. The retention of part of the payment to 
ensure quality is a common practice in the construction sector and 
may be appropriate in HIED, particularly for search tasks.
Are the Problems Addressed?
Effectiveness, efficiency, and defining the scope of works. This 
editorial helps to highlight the tension between effectiveness and ef-
ficiency in HIED activities, particularly during search actions. The 
clarification of the outputs from different activities will help man-
age expectations. Whereas the products of area and route search, 
and IEDD itself, can be treated much like their HMA equivalents 
for the purposes of contracting, these discussions also highlight 
that building-search tasks are going to be the most problematic 
from a contractual point of view. Use of a service-contract model in 
addition to a strong accreditation and quality management frame-
work may be the best approach for funding a building-search capac-
ity, with an added use of bonds or indemnities against items being 
found after a search is complete. Price must not be the only criteria 
for awarding HIED contracts or grants.
Re-mining or missed items. In IED response actions against 
legacy items, it would appear theoretically clear that there should 
be no instances of re-mining. Providing an appropriate risk as-
sessment is completed by the contracting or tasking agency, work 
should only be done in areas where there is limited risk of new, ac-
tive items being used. However, it is realistic to recognize that a re-
turn of insurgent activity is likely in many areas where there has not 
been some sort of comprehensive peace settlement. Thus, the use of 
robust handover procedures will help mitigate the liability of the 
service provider, who would not be liable for devices found or ac-
tivated after the handover process, but strong QM procedures will 
help ensure that the task site is not accepted unless there is sufficient 
confidence that the work has been fit for purpose.
Implications for work on active tasks. One of the assumptions 
made at the beginning of this editorial was that HIED work would 
tend to focus on legacy tasks. However, this may not always be the 
case every time civilian organizations are contracted for IED re-
sponse work. Tasks may involve the full range of IED initiation 
mechanisms, and there is also a much greater risk of re-mining. 
The latter can be dealt with contractually through a rigorous appli-
cation of the handover process, and through the maintenance of a 
security cordon normally in place during C-IED operations to pre-
vent re-entry by insurgents in the period between IED response ac-
tivities and handover. The increased complexity of active devices 
(in terms of their means of initiation) can similarly be addressed 
by ensuring that the contracting process pays sufficient attention 
to the need for training, equipment, and procedures for time- and 
Ser HIED activity Output Contracting 
model
Key deliverables Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)












3 Building search Building 
searched
Service contract Availability of search team 
in working days/years
Monitored by response 
time analysis
4 IED disposal (IEDD) IED destroyed Service contract Availability of search team 
in working days/years
Monitored by response 
time analysis
5 IED risk education (IED RE) RE given Output based Number of recipients
Figure 4. Possible contracting deliverables for HIED activities.
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command-initiated devices used by insurgents in the country in 
question at the time of the contract, implying a far more rigorous 
accreditation process. 
It should be clear that there is no contractual impediment for 
non-profit organizations undertaking active tasks: the questions of 
security and impartiality are questions for each organization to de-
termine themselves, and should not be assumed or imposed exter-
nally. For DDG, the question of active and legacy is a key part of a 
rigorous risk management process. Other organizations, including 
commercial organizations, may have a different approach depend-
ing on their appetite for risk. They may also be willing to take on 
other C-IED and force protection tasks that fall outside this edito-
rial definition of HIED response.
Product definition. The third problem highlighted previously 
was the need to understand what can be expected of HIED activi-
ties. This is a question of product definition and this editorial has 
set out how the lessons learned from HMA can be used to formu-
late both a set of HIED pillars and also the outlines for a ToC for all 
three of these main HIED components. It is important to note that 
while conversations often focus on IEDD, the need to first locate 
the device (through search) is a significant product in its own right. 
Also, one must recognize that IED RE for local populations must 
account for both the similarities and differences between land-
mines, UXO, and IEDs.
Recommendations
There is a widespread demand for HIED standards. Firstly, it is 
recommended that any such standards need to focus on the con-
tractual parameters, recognizing that the significant development 
in HIED is the increased funding of civilian organizations to carry 
out such work. Secondly, in order to develop contractual standards, 
it should be recognized that the first step is to define the main activ-
ities carried out under HIED, and that in the humanitarian sphere 
these include search and RE as well as IEDD. Thirdly, it is important 
to adopt the appropriate contractual model to reflect the nature of 
the activity. Fourthly, a range of quality management tools can be 
adapted for use in HIED contracts once this process of product defi-
nition is in place. 
This editorial does not pretend to address the complete require-
ment for HIED standards: much more work is needed to develop 
such standards in detail. However, it is hoped that it has set out the 
main areas of focus that will be needed if it is to be possible to ef-
fectively civilianize some IED response activities in the humani-
tarian sphere. 
See endnotes page 66
Ser QM technique Description Time frame Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 Accreditation Including assessment of training, equipment, key 




Observation: adherence with scope of works 
(SOW) and approved SOP
During operations SOW = scope of works
3 Handover 
procedures
Formal acceptance of completed task by customer 
from clearance agency (for route or area search)
Immediately at end of 
task
Establish point in time for mitigation of 
liability
4 Quality Control 
(QC)




• Number of items found after search
• Damage caused during disposal
Post-operation See discussion below
6 Accident 
investigations
Casualties caused by missed items or other poor 
procedures
As necessary Could be for injuries involving C-IED personnel 
or for civilians
7 Response time 
analysis
Comparison of performance compared to 
estimated norms, looking at number of tasks done 
and any backlog of tasks
Periodically Measurement of efficiency
8 KAP studies Measuring knowledge of people receiving IED RE Baseline and endline 
studies
9 Reduction in 
casualties
Comparison of casualty numbers over time Time-series study to 
compare effect of 
intervention over time
Can also compare with figures in area where 
program was not working (cross-sectional 
analysis)
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Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic 
materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military compo-
nents’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines 
or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase 
Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments 
will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or 
whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs 
and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and 
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items 
or components explosive in nature. 
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure 
or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes 
mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty. 
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ ele-
ments of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and Keeley, 
2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C. 
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 2017. 
http://bit.ly/2weqsLy. 
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great 
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://bit.
ly/1wPPgSM. 
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. Bonn: 
BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC Working 
paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory 
Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together 
to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 (2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese, 
Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. 
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while ca-
sualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100 
other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European 
Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World (2015): 
125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11.  Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey, 2017.
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